Joe：「節錄這段話，純粹是覺得這段話很有意思，紀錄一下。」
Berkshire, it should be emphasized, has not performed brilliantly since the 2012 substitution. But brilliance wasn’t needed: After all, Berkshire’s gain only had to beat that annual .88% bond bogey – hardly a Herculean achievement.
值得強調的是，2012年以來，Berkshire並沒有表現非常傑出。但其實也不需要非常傑出：畢竟，Berkshire的獲利，只需要打敗收益只有0.88%的債券，這根本不算是一個費力的任務。
The only risk in the bonds-to-Berkshire switch was that year end 2017 would coincide with an exceptionally weak stock market. Protégé and I felt this possibility (which always exists) was very low.
賣掉國債，買進Berkshire股票的唯一的風險是，2017年底之前，股市可能會出現大跌。不過Protégé和我覺得這種可能性（它一直存在）非常低。
2 factors dictated this conclusion: The reasonable price of Berkshire in late 2012, and the large asset build-up that was almost certain to occur at Berkshire during the 5 years that remained before the bet would be settled.
有兩個因素決定這個結論：Berkshire在2012年末的價格比較合理，和Berkshire在5年內幾乎肯定會出現大規模資產累積，這些投資在下賭注前已經確定。
資料來源http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2017ltr.pdf
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